Quantum intelligence

What is known, and what is not.

An evidence-based view of post-quantum cryptography and how prepared blockchains are for it. No readiness scores — only schemes, dependencies and the public record of migration work.

01Network overview

Three networks, compared

Property	Robinhood Chain	Ethereum	Solana
Signatures	ECDSA · secp256k1Account transactions	ECDSA · secp256k1Account transactions BLS12-381Validator attestations	Ed25519Accounts and validators
Dependencies	EVM account model and transaction format Arbitrum-based layer 2: inherits settlement and data security from Ethereum Keccak-256 hashing	KZG polynomial commitments for blob data Pairing-based cryptography in consensus Keccak-256 and SHA-256 hashing	Ed25519 keys double as account addresses SHA-256 hashing
Post-quantum initiatives	No chain-specific post-quantum initiative identified in the public sources reviewed.	Ethereum Foundation post-quantum programme (pq.ethereum.org) Hash-based signature research for consensus Account abstraction as a route to alternative signature schemes	Optional hash-based one-time-signature vault program (Winternitz Vault) Reported testnet experiments with post-quantum signatures
Migration status	No published plan identified Accounts use conventional elliptic-curve signatures. As an Ethereum layer 2, its migration path is closely tied to Ethereum's.	Research and specification Active research and specification work. No post-quantum signature scheme is in production for accounts or consensus.	Optional, application level An optional hash-based vault exists at the application level. Base-layer accounts and validators remain on Ed25519.

Compiled from public sources, last reviewed October 2026. Absence of an identified initiative means none was found, not that none exists.

02Cryptography explorer

Signatures and key establishment are different jobs

A signature proves who authorised a transaction. A key-establishment mechanism lets two parties agree on a secret for encryption. Blockchains depend mostly on the first.

Digital signature

ECDSA

Vulnerable to Shor's algorithm

Compact and fast. A sufficiently large fault-tolerant quantum computer could derive a private key from a public key; no such machine exists today.

Family: Elliptic curve
Hardness assumption: Elliptic-curve discrete logarithm
Standard: FIPS 186-5 · SEC 2 (secp256k1)
Typical use: Ethereum, EVM chains, Bitcoin

Sizes · secp256k1 · logarithmic scale

Public key33 B
Signature64 B

03Research timeline

Developments that shaped the transition

2026-01
Ethereum Foundation forms a dedicated post-quantum team
Post-quantum security is named a strategic priority, consolidating research on signatures, consensus and migration.
Ethereum Foundation
pq.ethereum.org
2025-05
Revised resource estimate for factoring RSA-2048
Estimates that RSA-2048 could be factored with under one million noisy qubits in under a week — a large reduction on earlier estimates, and still far beyond existing hardware.
Google Quantum AI
Gidney, arXiv:2505.15917
2025-03
HQC selected as an additional key-encapsulation mechanism
A code-based KEM chosen as a backup to ML-KEM, built on a different mathematical assumption.
NIST
NIST IR 8545
2025-01
Hash-based vault program published for Solana
An optional program that guards funds with Winternitz one-time signatures. It is opt-in and does not change base-layer signatures.
Solana ecosystem
Winternitz Vault
2024-12
Below-threshold quantum error correction demonstrated
The Willow processor showed logical error rates falling as code size grew — a milestone for error correction, not a cryptographically relevant machine.
Google Quantum AI
Nature, 2024
2024-11
Draft transition timeline for post-quantum cryptography
Proposes deprecating quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms after 2030 and disallowing them after 2035 in US federal systems.
NIST
NIST IR 8547 (initial public draft)
2024-08
First post-quantum standards published
ML-KEM, ML-DSA and SLH-DSA become final federal standards after an eight-year public process.
NIST
FIPS 203, 204, 205
2024-03
Proposal for an emergency recovery fork
Outlines how Ethereum could hard-fork to let most users recover funds through proofs over their seed phrase if a quantum emergency arose.
Ethereum research
ethresear.ch
1994
Shor's algorithm
A quantum algorithm that solves integer factorisation and discrete logarithms in polynomial time — the theoretical basis of the threat to elliptic-curve signatures.
AT&T Bell Labs
P. W. Shor, FOCS 1994

04Migration readiness

From research to production

Publicly evidenced stage, per network

Robinhood Chain
1. No plan identified
2. Research
3. Optional / app-level
4. Production
Ethereum
1. No plan identified
2. Research
3. Optional / app-level
4. Production
Solana
1. No plan identified
2. Research
3. Optional / app-level
4. Production

Stages are categories, not a ranking, and an optional application-level tool does not make a network quantum-resistant.

Existing cryptographic dependencies

Account signatures are the visible dependency, but not the only one. Consensus signatures, data-availability commitments and precompiles all rest on elliptic-curve or pairing assumptions and each needs its own replacement.

Proposed migration mechanisms

Account abstraction lets an account choose its own signature verification, which gives users a path to post-quantum schemes without a new address format. Emergency-recovery proposals cover accounts that cannot migrate in time.

Research implementations

Prototype verifiers, hash-based signature aggregation and testnet experiments exist across ecosystems. They demonstrate feasibility and measure cost; they do not protect assets on production networks.

Production deployment status

No major smart-contract network has replaced its base-layer account signatures with a post-quantum scheme. Testnet or opt-in support is not the same as production quantum resistance.

Three networks, compared

Property	Robinhood Chain	Ethereum	Solana
Signatures	ECDSA · secp256k1Account transactions	ECDSA · secp256k1Account transactions BLS12-381Validator attestations	Ed25519Accounts and validators
Dependencies	EVM account model and transaction format Arbitrum-based layer 2: inherits settlement and data security from Ethereum Keccak-256 hashing	KZG polynomial commitments for blob data Pairing-based cryptography in consensus Keccak-256 and SHA-256 hashing	Ed25519 keys double as account addresses SHA-256 hashing
Post-quantum initiatives	No chain-specific post-quantum initiative identified in the public sources reviewed.	Ethereum Foundation post-quantum programme (pq.ethereum.org) Hash-based signature research for consensus Account abstraction as a route to alternative signature schemes	Optional hash-based one-time-signature vault program (Winternitz Vault) Reported testnet experiments with post-quantum signatures
Migration status	No published plan identified Accounts use conventional elliptic-curve signatures. As an Ethereum layer 2, its migration path is closely tied to Ethereum's.	Research and specification Active research and specification work. No post-quantum signature scheme is in production for accounts or consensus.	Optional, application level An optional hash-based vault exists at the application level. Base-layer accounts and validators remain on Ed25519.

Compiled from public sources, last reviewed October 2026. Absence of an identified initiative means none was found, not that none exists.

Signatures and key establishment are different jobs

A signature proves who authorised a transaction. A key-establishment mechanism lets two parties agree on a secret for encryption. Blockchains depend mostly on the first.

Digital signature

ECDSA

Vulnerable to Shor's algorithm

Compact and fast. A sufficiently large fault-tolerant quantum computer could derive a private key from a public key; no such machine exists today.

Family: Elliptic curve
Hardness assumption: Elliptic-curve discrete logarithm
Standard: FIPS 186-5 · SEC 2 (secp256k1)
Typical use: Ethereum, EVM chains, Bitcoin

Sizes · secp256k1 · logarithmic scale

Public key33 B
Signature64 B

Developments that shaped the transition

2026-01

Ethereum Foundation forms a dedicated post-quantum team

Post-quantum security is named a strategic priority, consolidating research on signatures, consensus and migration.

Ethereum Foundation

pq.ethereum.org

2025-05

Revised resource estimate for factoring RSA-2048

Estimates that RSA-2048 could be factored with under one million noisy qubits in under a week — a large reduction on earlier estimates, and still far beyond existing hardware.

Google Quantum AI

Gidney, arXiv:2505.15917

2025-03

HQC selected as an additional key-encapsulation mechanism

A code-based KEM chosen as a backup to ML-KEM, built on a different mathematical assumption.

NIST

NIST IR 8545

2025-01

Hash-based vault program published for Solana

An optional program that guards funds with Winternitz one-time signatures. It is opt-in and does not change base-layer signatures.

Solana ecosystem

Winternitz Vault

2024-12

Below-threshold quantum error correction demonstrated

The Willow processor showed logical error rates falling as code size grew — a milestone for error correction, not a cryptographically relevant machine.

Google Quantum AI

Nature, 2024

2024-11

Draft transition timeline for post-quantum cryptography

Proposes deprecating quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms after 2030 and disallowing them after 2035 in US federal systems.

NIST

NIST IR 8547 (initial public draft)

2024-08

First post-quantum standards published

ML-KEM, ML-DSA and SLH-DSA become final federal standards after an eight-year public process.

NIST

FIPS 203, 204, 205

2024-03

Proposal for an emergency recovery fork

Outlines how Ethereum could hard-fork to let most users recover funds through proofs over their seed phrase if a quantum emergency arose.

Ethereum research

ethresear.ch

1994

Shor's algorithm

A quantum algorithm that solves integer factorisation and discrete logarithms in polynomial time — the theoretical basis of the threat to elliptic-curve signatures.

AT&T Bell Labs

P. W. Shor, FOCS 1994

From research to production

Publicly evidenced stage, per network

Robinhood Chain
1. No plan identified
2. Research
3. Optional / app-level
4. Production
Ethereum
1. No plan identified
2. Research
3. Optional / app-level
4. Production
Solana
1. No plan identified
2. Research
3. Optional / app-level
4. Production

Stages are categories, not a ranking, and an optional application-level tool does not make a network quantum-resistant.

Existing cryptographic dependencies

Proposed migration mechanisms

Research implementations

Production deployment status

No major smart-contract network has replaced its base-layer account signatures with a post-quantum scheme. Testnet or opt-in support is not the same as production quantum resistance.